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1 Introduction 
Online markets are developing rapidly in many industrialized countries and have already reached a rather 
mature status for some product categories. This, however, is not the case in the food sector. In Germany, the 
online food market captured still less than 1 % of total food sales in 2014. Despite this small share of the online 
market, the segment is clearly increasing and major players on the offline grocery market engage themselves 
on the online market, too, or they plan to do so. It is intended in this paper to contribute to our knowledge on 
competitive strategies of multichannel suppliers and pure online traders which are active on this growing 
market segment. A major element of competitive strategies on the online market for foods is pricing. We 
concentrate on pricing strategies of multichannel firms and pure online traders on the German online market 
and present evidence for the product group chocolate.  
More and quicker price information for consumers will become available with the development of online 
markets. Theory suggests that buyers’ search costs will be lowered and market efficiency will be improved. 
With lower search costs, it is expected that price dispersion will be reduced, i.e. markets will tend towards the 
law of one price for identical goods, and that the price level will decline and adjust rapidly. It may, however, 
happen that online markets induce new search costs for consumers as the variety of products offered will also 
increase substantially. It is an empirical question whether the level and the dispersion of prices will actually fall 
as the online supply of foods grows. The increasing empirical evidence on non-food markets indicates that 
remarkable differences between various suppliers persist with the growing importance of online markets and 
prices remain relatively rigid over time. Different explanations for these patterns are offered in the literature 
including a growing importance of product differentiation and non-price strategies on online and offline 
markets. 
Given this background, it is the objective of our contribution to describe, to measure and to explain price 
setting on the German online market for foods. After a brief review of the theoretical literature and major 
players on the German online market for foods, we will answer the following questions empirically: (i) Do major 
suppliers on the online market price homogeneous products identically? (ii) If not, how do prices vary across 
suppliers on the online market and between multichannel retailers and pure online traders? (iii) How do prices 
differ online and offline? (iv) How often do prices change on the online market? Are those prices really more 
flexible than offline? (v) Do pricing strategies on the internet follow the same pattern as in the established 
retailing sector, e.g., with regard to the major importance of price promotions in the competitive strategy of 
firms? Finally we intend to provide some tentative answers on why differential strategies of price setting can 
be observed across online food retailers. All questions of the contribution will be answered on the basis of 
primary data, in particular online data on prices of chocolate products.  
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2 Theoretical and Institutional Background 
2.1 Price Formation in Online Markets: A Selective Review of the Literature 
Theoretical expectations on price formation in electronic marketplaces, derived from information economics, 
are outlined by BAKOS (1997). According to the author, market inefficiencies are reduced by lowering buyers’ 
search costs. Consequently, lower market prices should arise. As it becomes easy for buyers to compare prices 
across sellers, prices should move towards the perfectly competitive level. As electronic markets lead to a 
much higher market transparency with regard to prices, one might also expect a lower price dispersion across 
sellers for a uniform commodity.  
Theoretical analyzes on search costs and price strategies go beyond the standard commodity argument for 
reduced buyer search costs. Incentives of buyers, sellers and independent intermediaries to engage in these 
markets are also investigated (BAKOS 1997). As product differentiation will also increase with electronic 
marketplaces, it may well be that search costs may actually increase in differentiated product markets 
(ANCARANI 2002). Sellers will engage in price and product differentiation and choose strategies to make it 
difficult for buyers to compare the increasingly complex information on product quality and offerings across 
sellers. Hence, two opposite effects arise: (i) reduced search costs on prices and (ii) additional search costs on 
products and qualities (ANCARANI 2002: 681). It is theoretically possible that price levels as well as price 
dispersion may actually rise. Given these theoretical predictions, it was tested empirically how the introduction 
of online markets actually affected prices. The focus of empirical studies was mainly on non-food products, e.g. 
on books and CDs (BRYNJOLFSSON and SMITH 2000), the online book industry (CLAY el al. 2002), digital cameras 
and flatbed scanners (BAYLIS and PERLOFF 2002) and standardized DVD brands (TANG and XING 2001). Although 
individual studies confirm a convergence of the price level (e.g. CLAY et al. 2002), other studies reveal 
consistently that price dispersion persists after the introduction of online markets even for homogeneous 
goods (BRYNJOLFSSON and SMITH 2000; TANG and XING 2001; BAYLIS and PERLOFF 2002).  
The remaining price dispersion is explained by BAYLIS and PERLOFF with the observation that firms differentiate 
prices between informed and uninformed consumers. Other authors argue that sellers tend to avoid pure price 
competition and rather use non-price strategies such as product differentiation or changes in service quality 
(e.g. CLAY et al. 2002). In their comparison of pure online and multichannel retailers, TANG and XING (2001) 
argue that the latter group tries to limit the price-decreasing effect of online pricing on its offline supply.  
Additionally, price rigidity in online markets seems to be relatively high (TANG and XING 2001). This is a 
surprising finding given the fact that it is technically very easy to adjust prices on electronic marketplaces 
quickly and often.  
Only very few studies have analyzed online pricing strategies on food markets (for an exception, see DOPLBAUER 
2015). However, it has been elaborated in detail for German grocery retailing how prices are set offline. Several 
studies confirm that high-low (HiLo) pricing as well as everyday-low-price (EDLP) strategies coexist in German 
grocery retailing (FASSNACHT, KÖTTSCHAU and WRIEDT 2012: 575). Retailers who pursue an EDLP strategy offer the 
products at permanently low prices. Suppliers with HiLo pricing provide their products at higher base prices 
and engage in frequent price promotions. The price level under promotions can be lower than the price level of 
an EDLP strategy (HOCH, DRÈZE and PURK 1994: 16). The most important instrument of price promotion is the 
special offer. A special offer is a price reduction of at least 5 % of the regular price for a maximum of four weeks 
(HANSEN 2006: 19). HiLo pricing is usually applied by supermarkets and consumer markets, whereas discounters 
typically utilize EDLP strategies (HANSEN 2006; HOFFMANN 2012; HERRMANN, MÖSER and WEBER 2009). Apart from 
special actions under HiLo pricing, food prices in grocery retailing tend to be rather rigid and much less volatile 
than prices on world markets of the agricultural commodities (HERRMANN, MÖSER and WEBER 2005; LOY and 
SCHAPER 2014).  
 
2.2 Online Food Markets in Germany and the Market for Chocolate Products 
In the following Section 3, price setting in German online grocery markets will be analyzed for national brands 
of chocolate bars. A brief overview of the German market for confectionary and chocolate products and a 
description of major players on the German online market for foods are provided first.  
In 2014, the sector confectionery, pastry goods and ice cream accounted for 8.4 %, i.e.  the fourth-largest share 
of the total turnover of the German food industry (with 172.2 billion Euros) (BVE 2015: 13-14). The most 
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important product category was chocolate products with a share of more than two fifths (5.3 million Euros) 
(BDSI 2015: 43).  
The market research institute FITTKAU & MAAß CONSULTING (2014) has conducted a survey on the topic of online 
food buying. More than 5,000 online shoppers and prospective online customers participated in the survey and 
more than 60 % of them had already bought confectionery and chocolate products online. Given the 
importance of this product category within the segment of online food shopping, we decided to examine the 
online market for chocolate, in particular the product chocolate bars. 
The price-setting behavior of eight suppliers on the German online market for foods was considered. We 
observed the four multichannel retailers REWE Online, real,- Drive, EDEKA24 and myTime.de as well as the four 
pure players Lebensmittel.de, Foodstore, World of Sweets and suesswarenhaus24.  
REWE was the first major food retailer who started an online delivery service for foods in 2011. REWE Online 
offers a full range of products from all product categories (LODERHOSE 2011: 1; REWE.DE 2016).  
Real operates with real,- Drive an online shop where goods can be ordered online and picked up in a stationary 
market by the customers or be delivered to their homes (REAL-DRIVE.DE 2016).  
Even the largest German food retailer has a presence in online grocery trading. However, the product range of 
EDEKA24 is considerably smaller than in the stationary markets (EDEKA24.DE 2016). 
The online shop myTime.de has operated since 2012 by the trading group Bünting. Bünting pursues a different 
strategy online than offline: the online assortment is with 34,000 products much larger and offers more high-
quality products (BÜNTING.DE 2016). 
Lebensmittel.de started its shop in 2009. Meanwhile, this pure player provides more than 24,000 products 
(RODE 2012: 73; LEBENSMITTEL.DE 2016). 
The Amazon third-party providers Foodstore, World of Sweets and suesswarenhaus24 use the Amazon 
marketplace as a sales platform for their products. The assortment of these pure players is significantly smaller 
compared to the other analyzed suppliers (AMAZON.DE 2016). 
 
3 Empirical Findings 
3.1 The Database 
As consumers are often geared to brands (WARD and LEE 2000: 16), a product range of twelve chocolate bars 
was selected for this analysis, consisting of national brand products. The chocolate bars of brands such as 
Milka, Ritter Sport, Alpia, Kinder Schokolade, Yogurette, Toblerone, Sarotti and Lindt were selected in the 
commercial packaging size of 100 grams. Data collection for daily prices of these products was carried out for 
every retailer. Altogether, the prices were collected for 93 days from August to November 2013 once a day 
from the respective websites of the providers. To compare the online prices with offline prices, data collection 
was carried out by the first author at selected Edeka, Real and Rewe on  November 25, 2013, in Giessen, Hesse, 
in Germany. 
 
3.2 Price Levels in the Online Market for Chocolate Bars: Uniform Prices for Homogeneous Goods? 
As there are lower search costs in online markets compared to the stationary trade, the online market for 
chocolate bars might have all of the characteristics of a perfectly competitive market. Thus, the law of one 
price might hold for all individual national brands. Therefore, we first analyze price levels in the online market 
for the selected chocolate products in order to test this hypothesis. Descriptive and inductive statistics are used 
to measure and to compare the price levels of the various suppliers, the pricing strategy of the retailers and the 
price dispersion. 
The distribution of online prices for the individual products was not normally distributed. In order to compare 
price levels of different suppliers, the median 𝑥� is then an appropriate indicator. In Table 1, the median values 
𝑥� for the various suppliers and national chocolate products are presented. 
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There are significant price differences between the various suppliers. An example: All multichannel retailers 
offered "Milka Alpenmilchcrème" for less than one Euro, while the prices of the pure players ranged between 
1.13 Euros (Lebensmittel.de) and 1.35 Euros (suesswarenhaus24). Although we might assume lower search 
costs at Foodstore, World of Sweets and suesswarenhaus24, as they act as Amazon third-party providers on 
one single platform, the median prices were still high. That controverts the results of BAKOS (1997: 1691) that 
reduced search costs lead to lower prices. 
Table 1: Comparison of Price Levels of Chocolate Bars across Online Retailers 
                       Retailer 
REWE 
Online 
real,-  
Drive 
EDEKA 
24 
MyTime.
de 
Lebens- 
mittel.d
e 
Food-
store 
World of 
Sweets 
Suess-
waren- 
haus24 
Chocolate  
Bars 
Milka Alpenmilch 0.95 0.89a 0.95b 0.89a c 1.19_2) 1.22d e 
Milka  
Alpenmilchcrème 
_2) 
0.95 0.89a 0.95b 0.89a 1.13c 1.19d 1.22e 1.35f 
Milka Noisette 
g 
0.95 0.89a 0.95b 0.89a 1.03c 1.19d 1.22e 1.35f 
Ritter Sport  
Edel-Vollmilch 
g 
0.89a 1.09_2) 0.75b 1.39c 1.08d 1.11e 1.40f 
Ritter Sport Nugat 
g 
0.89 0.85a 1.09b 0.75c 1.43d 1.19e 1.11f 1.40g 
Alpia Alpenmilch 
h 
0.65 0.49a b 0.69_2) c 0.89_2) 0.77d e 
Alpia Edel-Nougat 
_2) 
0.65 0.49a b 0.69_2) c _2) _2) _2) 
Kinder Schokolade 
_2) 
0.99 0.95a 1.19b 0.99c a 1.29_2) 1.29d 1.39d 
Yogurette 
e 
0.99 1.09a 0.99b 0.99a 1.17a 1.19c - d - 
Toblerone 1.29 1.19a 1.39b 1.19c 1.56b 1.69d 1.11e 1.89f 
Sarotti Schwarze 
Herren Edelbitter 
g 
0.99a 1.19_2) 1.19b b _2) 1.44_2) 1.99c 
Lindt Excellence  
70 % mild 
d 
1.95a _2) 1.95_2) a _2) 2.18_2) b 
 
_2) 
        1) This table shows the median in Euros. -  2) Because of missing prices not calculable. -  a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h
Source: Own data collection and calculations. 
 Median 
values  with the same superscript index in one row are not significantly different from each other. 
Furthermore, it was investigated whether the prices of the individual chocolate bars were significantly different 
across various retailers during the period of analysis. Since the data are not normally distributed (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test: p-value (0.000) < α (0.05)), nonparametric tests were used. The Kruskal-Wallis test showed that 
the prices of individual suppliers were significantly different from each other (p-value (0.000) < α (0.05)). 
Therefore, the suppliers were analyzed in pair-by-pair comparisons. The results of the Mann-Whitney tests can 
be seen based on the superscripts in Table 1. There are median values which are significantly different from 
each other (different indices (p-value ≤ α (0.05)), and other median values with no significant difference (same 
indices (p-value > α (0.05)). It is striking that there was often no significant price difference between 
multichannel retailers. As an example: For "Yogurette", no significant differences were found for three of four 
multichannel retailers (REWE Online, EDEKA24 and myTime.de). Apparently, the median of prices which 
multichannel retailers charge is often the same. In contrast, almost all median prices differ significantly from 
each other for pure players. Overall, significant price differences turn out between all suppliers. There is no 
retailer who offers all products at the lowest median price (see Table 1). 
In Table 2, the pricing of the two operating forms multichannel retailers and pure players is compared. 
Table 2: Comparison of Pricing between Multichannel Retailers and Pure Players 
                                                 Operating 
Form Multichannel 
Retailers Pure Players 
Chocolate Bars 
Milka Alpenmilch 0.89 1.19a 
Milka Alpenmilchcrème 
b 
0.89 1.22a 
Milka Noisette 
b 
0.89 1.22a b 
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Ritter Sport Edel-Vollmilch 0.89 1.11a 
Ritter Sport Nugat 
b 
0.89 1.19a 
Alpia Alpenmilch 
b 
0.65 0.89a 
Alpia Edel-Nougat 
b 
0.65 
Kinder Schokolade 
_2) 
0.99 1.29a 
Yogurette 
b 
0.99 1.19a 
Toblerone 
b 
1.19 1.69a 
Sarotti Schwarze Herren Edelbitter 
b 
1.19 1.99a 
Lindt Excellence 70 % mild 
b 
1.95 2.18a 
 
b 
  1) This table shows the median in Euros for the operating forms multichannel retailers and 
pure players. - 
2) Because of missing prices not calculable. -  a, b
Source: Own data collection and calculations. 
 Median values with the same superscript 
index are not significantly different from each other. 
It can be seen, e.g., that the multichannel retailers offered "Ritter Sport Nugat" for 0.89 Euros, while the 
median value for pure online retailers was 1.19 Euros. The absolutely lowest price difference can be observed 
for "Yogurette" with 0.20 Euros, the highest for “Sarotti Schwarze Herren Edelbitter” with 0.80 Euros. The 
computed Mann-Whitney U-tests suggest in all cases that national chocolate brand products are offered 
significantly more expensively by pure online retailers than by multichannel retailers. We know from selected 
non-food markets such as for DVD brands that the reverse holds true (TANG and XING 2001: 319). Apparently, 
chocolate bars and DVDs are different with regard to the price structure in online markets and, possibly, food 
and non-food markets may be generally different in that respect.  
Our conclusion from Tables 1 and 2 is that each pure player has a higher price level than multichannel retailers 
and the operating form multichannel retailer generally outperforms pure players. That multichannel retailers 
set lower prices could be due to the fact that the offline trading subsidized online trading (MALCHER 2013: 84). It 
might also be that pure players often sell chocolate bars in combination with other high-value foods or non-
foods and that this allows the pure players to capture a price premium on cheaper products such as chocolate 
bars.  
 
3.3 Dynamic Pricing Patterns in the Online Markets for Chocolate Bars: EDLP or HiLo Pricing? 
Do EDLP or HiLo strategies play a significant role on the German online market for foods as they do in offline 
markets? 
Retailers who pursue an EDLP strategy ought to provide all products at permanently low prices and without 
special offers (HOCH, DRÈZE and PURK 1994: 16). According to that, the price dispersion should be lower 
compared to a HiLo strategy. Price dispersion can be measured with the range (R), i.e. the difference between 
the highest and the lowest price, the standard deviation (s) and the coefficient of variation (CV).  
Once there are extreme values in the data set, the validity of the range R is limited. In this case, the standard 
deviation s and the coefficient of variation CV are preferable. Both incorporate each value of the data set. The 
coefficient of variation, as a relative measure of price volatility: 
100⋅=
x
sVC x   
with sx
The higher the coefficient of variation CV, the greater the volatility. If a retailer utilises an EDLP strategy 
without special offers and with a low volatility of prices, the range R as well as the standard deviation SD and 
the coefficient of variation CV are expected to be small. 
 = standard deviation of prices, ?̅? = mean price, seems particularly suitable. 
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We can derive from Tables 1 and 3 that the multichannel retailer myTime.de seems to follow an EDLP strategy. 
All chocolate bars were offered over the whole survey period at low and uniform prices. Both R and CV are 0.00 
Euros or 0 % respectively (see Table 3). Each observed price xi x was equal to the mean . 
The retailers REWE Online and real,- Drive used special offers during the period analyzed. The comparison of 
the two suppliers shows that real,- Drive adopts a stronger HiLo pricing than REWE Online. There was only one 
special offer for the Ritter Sport chocolate bars at REWE Online while real,- Drive used the promotional 
activities four times during the survey period. 
In the online shop EDEKA24 no special offers were observed. Prices were consistently at a uniform level (see 
Table 3). R and CV were 0.00 Euros or 0 % for every monitored chocolate bar during the study period. 
Apparently, the firm does not apply HiLo pricing in the selected product category. 
 
Table 3:  Comparison of Price Volatility for Individual Retailers 
            
Retailer 
  
Chocolate  
Bars 
REWE 
Online 
real,-  
Drive EDEKA24 
MyTime. 
de 
Lebens- 
mittel.de 
Food-
store 
World of 
Sweets 
Suess-
waren- 
haus24 
R CV R CV R CV R CV R CV R CV R CV R CV 
Milka 
Alpenmilch 0.00 0.00 0.30 9.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 _2) 
0.0
0 _2) 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 _2) 
Milka Alpen-
milchcrème 
_2) 
0.00 0.00 0.30 9.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
Milka 
Noisette 0.00 0.00 0.30 9.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 
11.2
3 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
Ritter Sport  
Edel-
Vollmilch 0.24 7.26 _2) 0.00 _2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
1 
0.3
1 
Ritter Sport 
Nugat 0.24 7.26 0.20 8.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 
10.6
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
Alpia 
Alpenmilch 0.00 0.00 0.10 7.53 _2) 0.00 _2) 0.00 _2) 
0.0
0 _2) 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 _2) 
Alpia Edel-
Nougat 
_2) 
0.00 0.00 0.10 7.53 _2) 0.00 _2) 0.00 _2) _2) _2) _2) _2) _2) _2) 
Kinder 
Schokolade 
_2) 
0.00 0.00 0.14 6.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 _2) 
0.0
0 _2) 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
Yogurette 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 1.47 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 _2) _2) _2) 
Toblerone 
_2) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
Sarotti 
Schwarze 
Herren 
Edelbitter 0.00 0.00 _2) 0.00 _2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 _2) _2) _2) 
0.0
0 _2) 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
0.0
0 
Lindt Excel-
lence 70 % 
mild 0.00 0.00 _2) _2) _2) 0.00 _2) 0.00 _2) _2) _2) 
0.0
0 _2) 
0.0
0 _2) 
 
_2) 
1) This table shows the range (R) and the coefficient of variation (CV) for every retailer. -  2)
Source: Own data collection and calculations. 
 Because of missing 
prices not calculable. 
The pure player Lebensmittel.de distinguished itself by a flexible supply and price-setting behavior. In Figure 1, 
the price development for the offered chocolate bars is shown. At the end of the observation period, none of 
the twelve chocolate bars was offered anymore.  
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Figure 1: Price Dynamics for Chocolate Bars at Lebensmittel.de, 08/26/2013-11/26/2013 (Prices in Euros) 
Source: Own data collection and calculations. 
Some variations during the observation period are visible. The price range R for "Milka Noisette" was 0.30 
Euros and for "Ritter Sport Nugat" even 0.40 Euros. It is remarkable that these values do not exist due to 
special offers, but because of frequent price changes. During those 65 days on which "Milka Noisette" was 
available, the price was changed six times. These frequent price changes indicate that menu costs are small 
online (BRYNJOLFSSON and SMITH 2000: 572). 
The Amazon third-party providers also do not follow the pricing pattern of the stationary food-retailing sector. 
There were no special offers. Thus, no HiLo pricing can be observed. Predominantly high prices indicate that 
they did not follow an EDLP strategy either. On the whole, the third-party providers set their prices very 
differently, although we might expect that search costs on Amazon would be the lowest and prices very similar. 
Thus we might assume uniform prices, but unexpectedly we see very different prices. Remarkably, each 
chocolate bar was offered at only one price without any price variation (except "Ritter Sport Edel-Vollmilch" at 
suesswarenhaus24: 1.39 Euros to 1.40 Euros). 
The results demonstrate that the multichannel retailers REWE Online and real,- Drive follow HiLo pricing and 
that myTime.de pursues an EDLP strategy, while none of the pure players shows one of the predominant 
pricing strategies prevailing in the grocery-retailing sector offline. Lebensmittel.de is distinguished by an 
untypically flexible price-setting behavior. 
 
3.4 Comparison of Price Dispersion for Multichannel Retailers and Pure Players 
To compare the price dispersion of multichannel retailers with the price dispersion of pure players the price 
range R, the standard deviation s and the coefficient of variation CV will be analyzed. Table 4 shows that there 
is price dispersion in multichannel retailing as well as in pure online retailing. 
Table 4: Comparison of Price Dispersion for Multichannel Retailers and Pure Players 
Operating Form 
Chocolate Bars 
Multichannel 
Retailers Pure Players 
R s CV R s CV 
Milka Alpenmilch 0.36 0.05 5.92 0.03 0.01 1.23 
Milka Alpenmilchcrème 0.36 0.06 6.10 0.22 0.07 5.69 
Milka Noisette 0.36 0.05 5.97 0.53 0.13 10.51 
Ritter Sport Edel-Vollmilch 0.44 0.15 16.08 0.32 0.15 12.17 
Ritter Sport Nugat 0.44 0.14 15.66 0.40 0.13 10.56 
Alpia Alpenmilch 0.30 0.10 15.81 0.12 0.06 7.19 
Alpia Edel-Nougat 0.30 0.10 15.81 _2) _2) 
Kinder Schokolade 
_2) 
0.24 0.09 8.89 0.10 0.05 3.62 
0,00 
0,20 
0,40 
0,60 
0,80 
1,00 
1,20 
1,40 
1,60 
Pr
ic
e 
(in
 E
ur
os
) 
Date 
Milka 
Alpenmilchcrème 
Milka Noisette 
Ritter Sport Edel-
Vollmilch  
Ritter Sport Nugat 
Toblerone 
Yogurette 
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Yogurette 0.10 0.04 4.27 0.06 0.02 1.46 
Toblerone 0.20 0.08 6.55 0.78 0.31 18.91 
Sarotti Schwarze Herren Edelbitter 0.20 0.09 8.39 0.55 0.27 15.96 
Lindt Excellence 70 % mild 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
average 0.28 0.08 9.12 0.28 0.11 7.94 
 
1) This table shows the range (R), the standard deviation (s) and the coefficient of variation (CV) 
for the operating forms multichannel retailers and pure players. - 2)
Source: Own data collection and calculations. 
 Because of missing prices 
not calculable. 
The price difference between the lowest and the highest price is on average 0.28 Euros in both operating 
forms. The price differences range from 0.00 Euros (“Lindt Excellence 70 % mild”) to 0.44 Euros (“Ritter Sport” 
chocolate bars) for the multichannel retailers. Large ranges of prices are mainly seen for the products that were 
expelled as special offers during the survey period. Rarely, low price ranges can be observed for the chocolate 
bars that were offered by pure players: 0.00 Euros for "Lindt Excellence 70 % mild", 0.03 Euros for "Milka 
Alpenmilch" and 0.06 Euros for "Yogurette". Despite these examples, price dispersion is considerably higher for 
most other products. The largest difference between the lowest and highest price for the operating form pure 
player is 0.78 Euros for "Toblerone". 
Comparing the standard deviations, multichannel retailers show smaller absolute dispersions from the average 
prices (average: 0.08 Euros) than pure players (average: 0.11 Euros). By contrast, the coefficient of variation for 
multichannel retailers shows an average of 9.12 %, while pure players result in an average CV of 7.94 %. This 
means that the absolute dispersion is greater for pure players while the relative measure of dispersion shows 
that pure players’ prices fluctuate less around the mean than multichannel retailers’ prices (on a percentage 
basis). The explanation for the differences in absolute and relative dispersion is the different price levels of 
multichannel retailers and pure players (see Table 2).  
In comparison to the results of CLAY et al. (2002: 352-353), who detected a price dispersion of 27 % and 73 % 
for books in the online market, the price variations in the online market for chocolate bars are still at a very low 
level. This can be explained by the fact that consumers perceive chocolate bars price sensitive. Consequently, 
only small deviations from the average price are possible (SAP and GfK 2010: 21). Nevertheless, it can be seen 
that online suppliers provide homogeneous products at different prices. The law of uniform pricing has not 
been enforced in the online market for chocolate bars. The result of GROVER, LIM and AYYAGARI (2006: 318) is 
confirmed: online providers can pursue different strategies of pricing despite reduced search costs. 
 
3.5 How Does Pricing Differ in Online and Stationary Markets for Chocolate Bars? 
To verify if the price level online complies with the price level offline, prices for the selected chocolate bars 
were collected in selected stores of the stationary food retailers Rewe1, Edeka2 and Real3
  
. Real communicates a 
price promise, pointing out that the prices online are the same as in retail stores (HANKE and WESP 2010: 10). At 
the time of data collection in 2013, Rewe and Edeka also made this price promise. Meanwhile, especially Rewe 
clearly communicated that the online prices may deviate from the offline prices (REWE.DE 2016). In Table 5, the 
prices of chocolate bars offline and online are displayed. The differences between the current prices on the 
observation day are shown as well. 
                                                 
 
1 Rewe, Grünberger Straße 114, 35394 Giessen, Hesse, Germany. 
2 Edeka, Hofmannstraße 14, 35392 Giessen, Hesse, Germany. 
3 real,- SB-Warenhaus, Gottlieb-Daimler-Straße 27, 35398 Giessen, Hesse, Germany. 
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Table 5: Price Levels Online and Offline (11/25/2013) 
Retailer 
  
Chocolate Bars 
Rewe Real Edeka  
Online Offline Online-Offline Online Offline 
Online-
Offline Online Offline 
Online-
Offline 
Milka Alpenmilch 0.95 0.89 0.06 0.89 0.89 0.00 0.95 0.89 0.06 
Milka  
Alpenmilchcrème 0.95 0.89 0.06 0.89 0.89 0.00 0.95 n.d. 
Milka Noisette 
_1) 
0.95 0.89 0.06 0.89 0.89 0.00 n.d. 0.89 
Ritter Sport  
Edel-Vollmilch 
_1) 
0.89 0.85 0.04 n.d. 0.85 1.09 _1) 0.89 0.20 
Ritter Sport Nugat 0.89 0.85 0.04 n.d. 0.89 1.09 _1) 0.89 0.20 
Alpia Alpenmilch 0.65 0.59 0.06 0.49 0.49 0.00 n.d. 0.59 
Alpia Edel-Nougat 
_1) 
0.65 n.d. 0.49 _1) 0.49 0.00 n.d. n.d. 
Kinder Schokolade 
_1) 
0.99 0.99 0.00 0.95 1.09 -0.14 1.19 0.99 0.20 
Yogurette 0.99 0.99 0.00 1.09 1.09 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.00 
Toblerone 1.29 1.25 0.04 1.19 1.19 0.00 1.39 1.19 0.20 
Sarotti Schwarze 
Herren Edelbitter 0.99 0.99 0.00 n.d. 0.99 1.19 _1) 0.99 0.20 
Lindt Excellence  
70 % mild 1.95 1.95 0.00 n.d. 1.95 n.d. _1) 1.49 
 
_1) 
  
 
  
 
  
 n.d. not distributed.- 1) 
Source: Own data collection and calculations. 
Because of missing prices not calculable. 
25 % of the REWE online prices represent the prices of the Rewe supermarket. Seven products were more 
expensive online than in the supermarket. This may be due to the fact that the considered supermarket in 
Giessen does not match the reference market for the online surveys, a store in Frankfurt. It might be that 
prices in the Rewe store in Frankfurt are higher and, therefore, closer to the REWE online prices. According to 
BUSCHLE (1997: 171), a high price level was predominant in the Rhine-Main region in the 1990s. As Rewe is no 
longer communicating the price promise, this might be due to regional differences in the level of prices in food 
retailing. 
The price level offered by Real corresponded online exactly to the price level offline, with one exception 
("Kinder Schokolade"). It should be noted that Real keeps its price promise. 
There were large differences between the price level online and offline for the multichannel retailer Edeka. 
Only "Yogurette" was offered online at the same price as offline. All other products were more expensive in the 
online shop. Five products showed an online price which was 0.20 Euros above the offline price. Despite 
regional price differences which were found for foods offline (BUSCHLE 1997), the high differences suggest that 
Edeka generelly charges higher prices online than offline. 
 
4 Summary and Conclusions 
Despite the increasing role of online markets for foods, studies on those markets in general and on price 
formation in particular have been rare. We contribute to the issue by investigating price setting and 
competition on the German online market for chocolate empirically. Online prices were collected for eight 
major suppliers and twelve products daily over a three-month period and prices of multichannel retailers were 
compared with the firms’ offline prices. Major findings and possible explanations for those are the following: 
Herrmann and Grein / Proceedings in System Dynamics and Innovation in Food Networks 2016, 89-100 
98 
DOI 2016: pfsd.2016.1610 
 
1. The law of one price does not hold. Major suppliers on the online market do not price homogeneous 
products identically. Apparently, reduced search costs due to readily available price information are 
compensated by other factors so that price differentials persist. One of these factors might be an 
increase in search costs due to stronger product differentiation in the online food market. 
2. There is a very clear pattern in the structure of median online prices across suppliers. In general, 
multichannel retailers charge lower prices than pure players on the online market. There seems to be 
a tendency that multichannel retailers do not deviate strongly from their offline prices which are 
affected by strong price competition in the German grocery-retailing sector. There seems to be the 
potential for pure players to raise the product price beyond the multichannel retailers’ prices. A 
reason may be that the existence of complementarities with other products the pure players offer 
lead to lower price elasticities of demand for standard products such as chocolate bars. 
3. Several multichannel retailers do not deviate significantly in their typical price level for the analyzed 
products online and offline, whereas one multichannel retailer offered most chocolate products online 
at higher prices than offline. As pure players charge higher prices online compared to their online 
competitors from multichannel retailing, we can conclude that prices of chocolate bars tend to be 
higher online than offline. This is very different from the non-food sector, where lower online prices 
have been identified as a threat for the established retailing sector. 
4. Dynamic pricing is different online and offline. The dominating price strategies of EDLP or HiLo pricing 
in the stationary food-retailing sector are not as widespread on the online market. Only myTime.de 
could be characterized as an online supplier with an EDLP strategy. Discounter-type EDLP strategies, as 
observed on offline markets, are lacking. A HiLo strategy was identified for two multichannel retailers 
but the price variability remained still rather low. It is remarkable that prices are rather stable since 
price adjustments can be realized easily and cheaply on online markets. 
It should be noted that all our conclusions refer to the product chocolate bars. It remains a task for future 
research whether these results are chocolate-specific or whether there are systematic differences for foods 
online and offline and between food and non-food products on online markets. It remains a major task as well 
to elaborate theoretically the reasons for differences in price formation online and offline and across products 
in online markets.  
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